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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
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COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE GUY R.
BURNINGHAM, PRESIDING.

OF APPEALS
^

Ujf. i

KFU
50
•AlU

si„~
,
(AyQ'bA'T'

TODD A. UTZINGER (6047)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
Attorneys for Appellee

C. DANNY FRAZIER

FILEllJ

Utah County Public Defender's Office
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2577

CCR 1 01995
|-tB J- u -

COURT OF APPfcALS
Attorney for Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 930344-CA
Priority No. 2

v.
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF
ATTEMPTED FRAUDULENT OBTAINING OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (1994), IN THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE GUY R.
BURNINGHAM, PRESIDING.

TODD A. UTZINGER (6047)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
Attorneys for Appellee

C. DANNY FRAZIER
Utah County Public Defender's Office
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2577
Attorney for Appellant
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
JURISDICTION P. NE • N A T U R E • Z 11 PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES . . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT * »I- I'HK FACTS
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . .
ARGUMENT.

.

A.

Defendant's Claim that he was Denied Effective
Assistance of Counsel During Plea Negotiations
is Misplaced

B.

Defendant has Failed to Allege any Specific
Incidents of Inadequate Performance by his
Counsel at Trial

C.

Defendant has Failed to Demonstrate that his
Having been Charged with a Second Degree
Felony Instead of a Third Degree Felony
Prejudiced Him at Trial .

CONCLUSION. .
ADDENDUM - NO ADDENDUM REQUIRED UNDER RULE 24(11) UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994)

6

State v. Colonna. 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988)

5

State v. Cosev, 873 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1994)

1

State v. Cummins. 839 P.2d 848 (Utah App. 1992)

5

State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985)

5

State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993)

6,

7

State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)

5

State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989)

3

State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah App. 1989)

5

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)

3

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). . 5
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994)

1,

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1993)

2,

7
1

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

MARVIN JEAN JACQUES,

:

Case No. 930344-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Attempted Fraudulent Obtaining of a Controlled Substance in a
Drug Free Zone, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in
and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Guy R.
Burningham, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel
as required under the sixth amendment?

When considering a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct
appeal, this Court should decide the issue as a matter of law.
State v. Cosev, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(7) (1994)
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit
any offense unlawful under this chapter is upon
conviction guilty of one degree less that the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with Attempted Fraudulent
Obtaining of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a Second
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (a) (ii)
and 58-37-8(5) (1994) (R. 1). Following a jury trial, defendant
was convicted as charged in the information (R. 167). The trial
court entered judgment for a second degree felony conviction and
sentenced defendant to a term of one to 15 years in the Utah
State Prison (R. 192). Defendant filed a notice of appeal (R.
200) .
While his case was pending on appeal, defendant filed a
motion for correction of an illegal sentence in district court.
Defendant argued there, as he was arguing on appeal, that he was
incorrectly charged with a second degree felony instead of a
third degree felony (R. 238-43).

Defendant requested, and this

Court granted, a stay of the proceedings on appeal pending a
resolution of his motion to correct an illegal sentence (R. 244).
This Court therefore temporarily remanded the case to the trial
court for consideration of defendant's motion (id.).
On remand, the trial court that because defendant was
convicted only of attempted fraudulent obtaining of a controlled
substance in a drug free zone, he was entitled to have the degree
of conviction reduced by one degree to a third degree felony (R.
250-52).

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(7) (1994).

The trial

court therefore granted defendant's motion and reduced the degree
of conviction to a third degree felony and amended his
2

accordingly (R. 249).
Having had his illegal sentence corrected, defendant
filed a supplemental brief on appeal that he asked this Court to
view as a "replacement brief" because the issues on appeal had
been altered.

Br. of Appellant at 5.

The State therefore

responds to the claims raised in defendant's "supplemental
brief."
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On August 8, 1992, Lawrence Groneman, a pharmacy
director at Edgemont Pharmacy in Provo, was working with
technicians Jody Kirk and Barbara Mendenhall (R. 225 at 91). At
approximately 4 p.m. an individual claiming to be Dr. Scott
Hansen called in a prescription for Vicodin (a schedule three
controlled substance) for Ken Wilson (R. 225 at 93-94, 159) .
Groneman was suspicious and decided to call the doctor at home to
verify the prescription (R. 225 at 94-95).

Dr. Hansen told

Groneman that he had not called in the prescription and said he
could not recall a patient named Ken Wilson (R. 225 at 95-96,
158) .
Groneman called the police and informed the pharmacy
technicians of the problem.

When defendant attempted to pick up

the Vicodin, Groneman tried unsuccessfully to detain him (R. 225
at 97-98, 132, 225) . Defendant left the pharmacy, but he was
soon

apprehended by police (R. 225 at 104, 136, 170, 196, 241).
1

The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989); State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989).
3

After Groneman and Kirk identified defendant as the man who had
attempted to pick up the Vicodin, defendant was arrested (R. 225
at 104, 136, 173, 241).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim that his counsel's alleged failure to
recognize that defendant should have been charged with a third
instead of a second degree felony prejudiced him during plea
bargain negotiations is misplaced.

The constitution guarantees a

fair trial, not a fair plea bargain.

Because defendant asserted

his right to a jury trial, he is restricted to challenging the
outcome of that trial, not the outcome of plea negotiations.
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at trial. His ineffectiveness claims
should therefore be rejected as mere speculation.
Defendant should have been convicted of a second and
not a third degree felony.

That does not mean, however, that

defendant was not properly charged.

Under Utah law, the

reduction in the degree of conviction to which defendant was
entitled is made at the time judgment is entered, not at the time
charges are filed.

The improper judgment against defendant was

amended to reflect a one degree reduction in his conviction.
Defendant's claim that he was nonetheless prejudiced at trial is
therefore misplaced because there was ample evidence to support
his conviction.

ARGUMENT

Defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel.
In order to demonstrate otherwise, defendant "must show (1) his
4

counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) there
exists a reasonable probability that, absent the deficient
conduct, the verdict would have been more favorable to
defendant."

State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 858 (Utah App. 1992)

(citing State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), and State
v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah App. 1989)).

Accord

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
Here, defendant has failed to meet his burden under either of
Strickland's two prongs.
A.

Defendant's Claim that be was Denied Effective
Assistance of Counsel During Plea Negotiations is
Misplaced.

The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "our state
and federal constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea
bargains."

State v. Gearv, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).

Accordingly, the Court has "generally refused to oversee the
bargaining process" in cases in which defendants convicted at
trial allege that trial counsel was ineffective during plea
negotiations.

State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Utah 1988)

(citing Geary, 707 P.2d at 646). Accord State v. Knight. 734
P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987).
In this case, as in Geary, Colonna and Knight,
defendant proceeded to trial. Having been convicted after a jury
trial, defendant is restricted to challenging "the outcome of
[his] trial, not the outcome of plea bargaining."
P.2d at 919 n.7.

Knight. 734

To the extent defendant appears to argue that

his trial counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations, this
5

Court should reject defendant's claim as inconsistent with Geary,
Colonna and Knight.2
B.

Defendant has Failed to Allege Any Specific
Incidents of Inadequate Performance by his Counsel
at Trial.

Defendant's claim that the outcome of his trial would
have been different had it not been for counsel's alleged
inadequate performance should be rejected as mere speculation.
See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 62 (Utah 1993) ("Absent
anything beyond mere speculation, [Utah courts] reject . . .
ineffectiveness claim[s] for lack of prejudice.").
Defendant has failed to identify specific instances of
inadequate performance arising during his trial, let alone any
prejudice flowing therefrom.

Rather, defendant argues that his

counsel's alleged failure to recognize that defendant was
improperly charged with a second degree felony indicates that
counsel's performance at trial must have likewise been
substandard.

As discussed below, the charge against defendant

was correct, but the degree of conviction should have been
reduced when judgment was entered.

2

But even assuming defendant's

Defendant claims that the standard that applies to
ineffectiveness claims arising from a guilty plea should apply to
this case. In so doing, defendant relies on Parsons v. Barnes,
871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) (A defendant challenging a guilty plea
on ineffectiveness grounds must prove that counsel's deficient
performance "affected the outcome of the plea process."). That
reliance is misplaced because the entry of a guilty plea requires
the waiver of one's right to a jury trial. In this case,
however, defendant asserted his right to a jury trial. Because
there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain comparable to
the right to a jury trial, Parsons is inapposite. Rather, this
case is controlled by Geary, Colonna and Knight.
6

first proposition were true, the latter does not necessarily
follow.

Absent the identification of specific instances of

inadequate performance and a demonstration of prejudice to
defendant flowing therefrom, defendant's claim that he would have
received a more favorable outcome at trial should be rejected as
mere speculation.
C.

Id.

Defendant has Failed to Demonstrate that his
Having Been Charged with a Second Degree Felony
Instead of a Third Degree Felony Prejudiced Him at
Trial.

Finally, defendant's claim that the trial court and his
counsel failed to recognize that he was improperly charged with a
second degree felony is misplaced.

Under the plain language of

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(7), the reduction in the degree of
conviction for attempted offenses, as opposed to completed
offenses, is made "upon conviction" -- not at the time charges
are filed.

Accordingly, defendant was properly charged with a

second degree felony.

It was at the time judgment was entered,

not at the point the information was filed, at which the parties
below should have recognized that defendant was guilty of a third
degree felony instead of a second degree felony.

That problem

has been rectified because the trial court amended its judgment
and resentenced defendant based on his conviction of a third
degree felony.
In any event, the evidence adduced at trial clearly
supported defendant's conviction of attempted fraudulent
obtaining of a controlled substance.

Certainly, it cannot be

said that defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that had
7

his offense been charged as a third degree felony instead of a
second degree felony the outcome of his trial would likely have
been different.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
summarily affirm defendant's conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
The facts and legal standards necessary for resolution
of this appeal are adequately set forth in the briefs.

Oral

argument would therefore be of little benefit to this Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fj/—day

of February, 1995,

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

CUtA
TODD A. UTZlNGI
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, via first class
mail, to C. Danny Frazier, attorney for defendant/appellant, 4 0
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